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This paper studies the optimal contest design that maximises the total
expected e¤ort of potential players when they have nonlinear cost functions.
The contest organiser aims to induce higher e¤ort by utilising a combination
of four instruments: shortlisting of potential players, entry sequence of partic-
ipants (either simultaneous or sequential), entry fees paid by participants, and
disclosure policy of the number of participants, whenever each is applicable.
Shortlisted players decide whether to enter a contest upon observing the pol-
icy combination of the organiser. We derive and compare the optimal entry
fees and optimal disclosure policy under each entry pattern for each number
of shortlisted players. We nd that the concavity (convexity) of the cost func-
tion plays a crucial role for the optimal design. Assuming that the contest is
optimally designed after each entry pattern, simultaneous entry with a pol-
icy of disclosing the number of participants would induce the highest e¤ort
when costs are concave. While the optimal number of shortlisted players is
not explicitly solved, at the optimum each of them enters stochastically. Al-
ternatively, when costs are convex, the organiser would optimally include all
potential players who at the optimum, would enter with certainty. All com-
binations of entry pattern and disclosure policy induce the same amount of
e¤ort at the optimum.
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1 Introduction
Many economic settings can be thought of as being competitive in nature where
agents make costly investments in order to win a prize. Examples of competi-
tions frequently studied include internal labour market competitions, political
campaigns, and research and development (R&D) contests. Contest theory
provides a systematic and consistent framework in which these competitions
can be analyzed.
A burgeoning literature has taken this approach and tried to incorporate
various features of real-world competition into the framework. Some of the fea-
tures studied are asymmetries among contestants (Cornes and Hartley (2005),
Szymanski and Valletti (2005)), multiple prizes (Clark and Riis (1996, 1998),
Schweinzer and Segev (2008)), multiple stages (Gradstein and Konrad (1999),
Fu and Lu (2010b), Fullerton and McAfee (1999)) and di¤erent mechanisms to
select the winner (Atsu Amegashie (2009), Nti (2004)). Clearly, the strategic
interactions among contestants depend on these various dimensions in which
contests di¤er.
The primary focus here is to examine how the contest organizer makes use
of a combination of instruments and in particular the order in which partic-
ipants enter the contest to a¤ect e¤ort. Consider political campaigns, essay-
writing competitions and R&D contests. Despite being canonical settings that
can be modeled as contests, they primarily di¤er in the sequence players par-
ticipate. In political campaigns, candidates usually acquire information on
the existing number of rivals who have declared their intention to run for elec-
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tion in a constituency before deciding whether to run.1 Such contests can be
analysed by sequential entry.
The analysis is quite di¤erent for R&D. Researchers often do not know
who are competing for the same patent rights unless the organizer announces
a shortlist. Likewise in a drawing competition, students submit their works
before a stipulated deadline without knowing the number of other entries.
The latter two examples can be analyzed by simultaneous entry, the essential
di¤erence between them lies in whether participants observe the number of
rivals they are competing against.2 Matters such as how these entry patterns
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Figure 1: Comparison of entry patterns
1Opposition candidates are afraid of splitting up the opposition votes.
2Simultaneous entry applies more generally in circumstances where players are large in
numbers or separated geographically.
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To avoid complicating the exposition unnecessarily, a convenient assump-
tion is made such that the contests are optimally designed following each entry
pattern. The objective is to understand how the contest organizers policy
measures below directed at maximizing total e¤ort must take into account the
circumstances of each entry pattern. An important component of the analysis
is to assume players have non-linear costs.3 R&D contests o¤er a simple ex-
ample. If e¤ort takes the form of monetary outlays, it is reasonable to think of
rmsmarginal costs of e¤ort to be linear. Otherwise, if rms incur high initial
marginal cost of capital which becomes relatively lower when the rm is more
established, then it may be more appropriate to think of the e¤ort costs as
concave. Other factors that add to the high initial costs include legal restric-
tions and market development. In contrast, if e¤ort su¤ers from diminishing
returns then e¤ort costs may be convex. Subsequent results will be categorized
according to whether the playerse¤ort costs are concave or convex.
The organizer maximizes total e¤ort by utilizing a combination of three
further policy measures, whenever each is applicable. First, the organizer
has the ability to shortlist and to invite a subset of potential players to the
contest. Perhaps surprisingly, the organizer may not always want all potential
players to be involved in the contest. An excessive number of potential players,
especially in the case where players have concave costs, destroy the incentives
to exert e¤ort.
Second, the organizer can collect entry fees from each player who would
3Even though convex costs may be a more general mathematical representation of a cost
function than linear costs, yet it is an implicit assumption that rms do not innovate or
improve their e¢ ciency to reduce their costs of exerting higher e¤ort. Thus in an economic
sense, the latter could be thought of as being more general.
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like to participate in the contest.4 Our analysis lies in the ability of the contest
organizer to add the sum of entry fees collected to the nal prize.5 From an
e¤ort-maximizing organizers perspective, doing so would create a diversity of
possibilities. Higher entry fees discourage participation in the contest which
reduces total e¤ort. Contrariwise, entry fees collected add to the size hence
attractiveness of the nal prize, hence encouraging players to exert more e¤ort.
As will be shown later, entry fees can be used directly in the case of sequential
entry to control the desired number of participants and this eliminates the role
of shortlisting in sequential entry.
Third, the organizer can also determine whether to disclose the number
of participants in a contest. Again, this measure is not relevant in the case
of sequential entry because potential players always observe the pre-existing
number of participants before deciding whether to participate.6 The decision
of whether to disclose the number of participants has important consequences
in the simultaneous entry setting though. Numerous studies have provided
strong predictions that participants exert higher e¤ort when they do not ob-
serve the number of rivals. In fact as Lim and Matros (2009) argued, each
participant exerts more e¤ort under some uncertainty about the number of
participants than under certainty. However, with the introduction of entry
fees into the model, it may seem plausible that an organizer will instead prefer
to disclose the number of participants in order for participants to fully inter-
4Familiar names for entry fees include registration fees and admission fees.
5Schemes resembling negative entry fees (subsidies) are often prescribed in R&D con-
tests to encourage participation. However, there may be circumstances where the organiser
charges substantial entry fees to ensure that only nancially healthy rms participate in the
contest.
6If they are not observed, then this becomes a case of simultaneous entry.
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nalize the e¤ects of entry fees in enhancing the nal prize. When the number
of participants is concealed, participants internalize the e¤ects of the enlarged
nal prize imperfectly and equilibrium e¤ort may be lower.
In the next section, I explain how the setup of the model in this paper
relates to the rest of the literature and in Section 3 I formally setup the model.
Section 4 studies how should contests be designed in a simultaneous entry
setting and I show that a policy of disclosure is a dominant strategy for the
organizer. Section 5 considers contests where participants enter sequentially
using a generalization of the results in Fu and Lu (2010a). Together these
results are used to examine and compare the optimal entry pattern that induces
the highest e¤ort in Section 6. When costs are concave, simultaneous entry
with a policy of disclosure induces the highest e¤ort. Alternatively, when costs
are convex, all entry patterns induce the same amount of e¤ort.
2 Related literature
This paper integrates separate studies on shortlisting, entry sequences, entry
fees and disclosure policy within a single framework. Fu and Lu (2010a) stud-
ied a contest in which players sequentially decide whether to participate upon
observing the level of entry fees set by the contest organizer. The authors
demonstrated that negative entry fees can be used as a form of subsidy to
encourage participation by o¤setting playersentry costs. In settings without
entry costs, such as the one considered in this paper, the importance of entry
fees is less obvious and remains to be justied. Fu and Lu (2010a) takes the
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view in line with many other studies in the literature that at the optimum, the
contest organizer should shortlist a subset of potential players to invite to the
contest. This is based on the key assumption that players have a xed entry
cost and linear e¤ort costs. In this paper, by allowing players to have nonlinear
e¤ort costs but no xed entry cost, we propose an alternative result and show
that shortlisting is only useful when players have concave costs but not when
players have convex costs. Fu and Lu (2010a) developed their analysis in the
context of sequential entry. In this paper, we further extend the analysis to
simultaneous entry.
Simultaneous entry contests have been studied by Myerson and Wärneryd
(2006), Lim and Matros (2009), Fu et al. (2010), among others. These studies
improved the exibility of contest theory by relaxing the assumption that
the number of participants is common knowledge. Instead, the presence of
each participant is determined by a common prior probability distribution.
The latter two papers specically focused on the binomial distribution and
compared whether disclosing or concealing the number of participants induces
higher total e¤ort. Lim and Matros (2009) showed that with linear e¤ort
costs, disclosing or concealing the number of participants does not a¤ect total
e¤ort. By contrast, Fu et al. (2010) showed that the optimal disclosure policy
depends on the impact function of the players. Here, we show that the optimal
disclosure policy may also depend on the e¤ort cost function of the players.
Furthermore, the above-mentioned studies on simultaneous entry typically
assume variations in the number of participants depend on exogenous factors.
The absence of an instrument to directly inuence the number of participants
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limits our ability to make comparisons in total e¤ort across di¤erent contest
designs. This paper improves the simultaneous entry literature along this
dimension by allowing the organizer to inuence players entry decision by
using the combination of instruments, including shortlisting and entry fees.
This paper is most closely related to Fu et al. (2011) as it applies the
same principles of endogenous entry in a simultaneous entry setting where the
contest organizer is able to inuence the entry probability of the participants
by utilizing the instruments on hand. However in Fu et al. (2011) instead of
entry fees to be paid to the contest organizer, participants incur entry costs.
Such di¤erent formulation of the setting leads to outcomes that are di¤erent
from those in this paper. Fu et al. (2011) argued that when players have convex
costs, the organizer avoids inviting the full set of potential players as it would
increase the competitiveness and reduce the attractiveness of participating in
the contest. Here in this paper, by allowing the organizer to collect entry fees
and to add the sum collected to the nal prize, the enhanced nal prize o¤sets
the e¤ect of increased competitiveness and inviting the full set of potential
players may increase e¤ort instead. Furthermore, concealing the number of
participants no longer dominates disclosing in terms of total e¤ort induced as
disclosing the number of participants allows them to internalize the e¤ects of
the enhanced nal prize more e¢ ciently and exert a higher e¤ort.
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3 The setting
There is a set of identical7 and risk-neutral potential players at the start of the
contest, represented byM. Denote the size ofM by jMj = M . The contest
organizer aims to induce the highest total expected e¤ort by utilizing four
instruments: shortlisting of potential players, entry sequences of the shortlisted
players, entry fees to be paid by the participants, and whether to disclose the
number of participants.
The organizer rst decides whether to shortlist a subset of potential players
to the contest and also the number to shortlist. He then announces the rule
of the contest to the shortlisted players including their entry sequences, entry
fees and whether to disclose the number of participants, after which the play-
ers would make their entry decisions. There are two types of entry sequences.
First, shortlisted players can enter sequentially. In this case, whether to dis-
close the number of participants is not relevant as the number of participants
is automatically revealed and the shortlisted players enter one at a time while
observing the number of pre-existing participants. Second, the shortlisted
players can also enter simultaneously without observing the entry decisions of
others. In this case, the organizer can choose to disclose or conceal the num-
ber of participants. Regardless of the entry sequence and disclosure policy, the
organizer sets the entry fees which must be paid by each participant.
7Other studies such as Cornes and Hartley (2005), and Szymanski and Valletti (2005)
have accomodated asymmetry among the players. Discrimination, di¤erences in capabilities
are various interpretations of asymmetry among the players, where players who exert the
same e¤ort have unequal chances of winning the competition. When players di¤er in their
capabilities, an e¤ort-maximising contest organiser may choose to make use of multiple prizes
to encourage weaker players to exert e¤ort so as to maintain a healthy level of competition.
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Denote the set of players who chooses to participate in the contest after
learning the rules of the contest by N  M and the size of N by jN j = N .
Henceforth, I call active players participants, that is, players who chose to
participate. Denote by F  0 the entry fees charged to each participant of
the contest. As a feature of the analysis, the sum of entry fees collected from
all participants can be added to the total budget of the organizer to enhance
the nal prize, which would create more incentive for the participants to exert
higher e¤ort. The organizer is able to o¤er all the entry fees collected as the
nal prize, in addition to his initial budget B0. Thus in a contest with N
participants, the value associated by the nal prize is denoted by VN . We can
also state the budget constraint of the organizer in terms of the number of
participants.
Denition 1 (Feasible Contest). A contest is feasible if for all N , 0 < VN 
B0 +N  F .
Suppose an estate conducts a drawing competition and the organizer with
an initial budget of $50 charges a registration fee of $2 per student, then
the value of the nal prize should be no more than $90 when there are 20
participants.
Participants compete for the nal prize by exerting a costly e¤ort si-
multaneously and independently. A typical participant i chooses an e¤ort
ei 2 Ei = R+. Higher e¤ort leads to a higher overall performance that might
rely on more than one factor. Organizers evaluate participants based on the
relative ranking of this stochastic performance produced by their e¤ort. In
the context of a R&D contest, higher e¤ort exerted by the competing rms
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may be in the form of increasing investments to purchase advance equipments,
hire the best researchers, or devoting more man-hours to the project, all of
which could eventually lead to better innovation and a higher quality of the
prototype.
With some regularity conditions, Fu and Lu (2011) have shown that the
winning probabilities of the participants follow the well-adopted Tullock con-
test models, which is a type of imperfectly discriminatory contest8 where the
participants with the highest e¤ort does not win the contest with certainty,
but with the highest probability.
To give an illustration of such an evaluation mechanism, consider again
the R&D contest where the esthetical design of the prototype plays a role in
the outcome. Whether the judges like the design of the prototype depends
on their tastes and preferences, which is unobservable. Consequently, it is
reasonable to say that the rm with the highest e¤ort does not win the contest
with certainty but only with the highest probability. Formally, the probability
Pi : j2N Ej ! [0; 1] that participant i wins the contest satises
Pi (e jN ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if N = 1;
1
N





where e = (e1; : : : ; eN) represents the vector of participantse¤ort and
P
i2N Pi =
1. In case of a tie where participants exert the same e¤ort9, the tied partic-
8The complement of an imperfectly discriminatory contest is a perfectly discriminatory
contest, also known as an all-pay contest. Siegel (2009, 2010) derived the equilibrium payo¤s
and also provided an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in these contests.
9For example, all players exert the same e¤ort under a symmetric equilibrium. Because
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ipants win the prize with equal probabilities. f () is known as the impact
function and can be interpreted as a players production technology. We typi-
cally assume f 0 () > 0 with f (0) = 0. In this paper, we focus on the popularly
adopted Tullock contest success function where f (ei) = eri , where the parame-
ter r > 0 measures the responsiveness of the winning probability to participant
is increases in e¤ort.10
It is costly for a participant to exert an e¤ort. The cost function usually
takes a linear form in the literature. According to Szidarovszky and Okuguchi
(2008), in a contest where players have impact function f () and linear ef-
fort costs, concavity of f () provides a su¢ cient condition for the existence
and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium. In this paper, we allow the cost
function to be nonlinear.
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption A1: For all i, the e¤ort cost function of the players takes the





According to A1, the cost function can be concave ( < 1) or convex
( > 1). Later analysis shows that the concavity (convexity) of the cost
players are identical, the way these e¤orts translate into winning probability is identical for
all players and they value the prize equally so a symmetric equilibrium is a relevant solution
concept.
10When r = 0, e¤ort has no impact on winning probability so the contest becomes a
random lottery. When r tends to innity, the player with the highest e¤ort wins with
certainty and the contest becomes an all-pay auction. For example in a two-player contest,






= 1 [1 + (ejei)r]  !
r!1 1. A standard all-pay
auction is a special type of all-pay contests.
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function has important implications for the optimal design of the contest. A2
guarantees the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric pure-strategy bidding
equilibrium in a standard Tullock contest with N  M participants and a
single xed prize (Schweinzer and Segev, 2008). The analysis in Fu et al. (2010)
further implies that it is also a su¢ cient condition for a unique symmetric pure-
strategy bidding equilibrium whenN M participants enter with a symmetric
non-dengenerate probability into a contest with a single xed prize.
4 Simultaneous entry
In a contest with simultaneous entry, after learning the level of entry fees and
nal prize, the shortlisted potential players decide simultaneously whether they
want to participate in the contest. Although stated to be a simultaneous entry
contest, it does not necessarily imply that potential players enter simultane-
ously. It su¢ ces that each potential player chooses his entry decision without
knowledge of other playersdecisions. Uncertainty about the number of ri-
vals can be modeled by introducing an element of randomness in the presence
of each participant in the contest. The number of participants depends on
a common binomial distribution with the endogenous probability of a player
participating in a contest denoted by 0  q  1, where q is the probability of
success in a binomial distribution that depends on the number of shortlisted
players, the entry fees and whether the number of participants is disclosed.11
The timing of the simultaneous entry contest is as follows:
11The mean number of participants is Mq and variance is Mq (1  q).
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Stage 1 Organizer announces a shortlist of potential players.
Stage 2 Organizer announces the level of entry fees, the nal prize scheme
and whether he would disclose the number of participants to the set of
shortlisted players.
Stage 3 After the organizers announcement, shortlisted players simultane-
ously and independently decide whether to participate.
Stage 4 Upon observing the actual realization of participants, the organizer
discloses or conceals the number of participants, according the announced
rule of the contest.
Stage 5 Unless the organizer chose a policy of disclosure in the previous stage,
participants exert their e¤ort simultaneously without observing the num-
ber of rivals and the winner is selected.
The tendency to shortlist a subset of potential players is a familiar theme
in the literature. OKee¤e et al. (1984) noted that an advantage of contests is
to entice the right types of people to participate. This logic is also the basis
of many later studies such as Che and Gale (2003), Fullerton and McAfee
(1999) and Taylor (1995) that focused on asymmetric players and the ways
the organizer should select the appropriate types to participate. Such views
are di¢ cult to be justied in settings where players are symmetric. This gap in
the literature was highlighted by Fu et al. (2011) who studied the case where
entry involves a sunk cost and e¤ort cost function is linear. Here, in this paper,
we will assume there is no sunk cost for entry but the e¤ort cost function can
be nonlinear.
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Suppose K potential players are shortlisted. Once the level of entry fees
and nal prize scheme (VN ; N = 1; 2; :::; K) are announced, the K shortlisted
players play a game. The entry and bidding behavior upon entry would depend
on the disclosure policy of the organizer. We rst consider the case where the
number of participants is disclosed by the organizer.
4.1 Disclosing the number of participants
Disclosing the number of participants can be thought of as a benchmark case
in a contest with simultaneous entry. After all participants have entered, the
organizer announces the number of participants. Because the number of rivals
is announced, there is no uncertainty in the actual number of participants
when participants choose their optimal e¤ort and each contest after the entry
stage is a proper subgame. In this case, for a particular realization of N ,
participant is problem is to maximize
Di (N) = Pi (e)VN| {z }
Expected revenue from participation
  (ei + F )| {z };
Costs of participation
(2)
where the subscript D denotes a policy of disclosure by the organizer. Fur-
thermore note that for a given N number of participants, the expected revenue
from participation depends on the prole of e¤ort e = (e1; e2; : : : ; eN) from
all participants while the costs of participation only depend on player is own
e¤ort level. Costs are incurred regardless of whether the participant wins or
loses and constitutes of e¤ort costs and an entry fee. It is analogous to a
two-part tari¤ in industrial organization literature where a per-unit price is
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charged in addition to a xed payment made upfront. The payo¤ function is
standard and equilibrium e¤ort is characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium e¤ort under policy of disclosure). Under Assumptions












When N = 1; eD(1) = 0.
Proof. See appendix A.1.
Now we are ready to characterize the symmetric entry equilibrium, i.e.
equilibrium entry probability q. Suppose all other shortlisted players enter
with probability q. The ex ante payo¤ of a shortlisted contestant i from












  [eD(N)]   F| {z }
Payo¤ given a realization of N participants
9>>=>>; :
(4)
Denition 2 (Simultaneous entry equilibrium under policy of disclosure).
Suppose K potential players are shortlisted. With simultaneous entry and dis-
closure of the number of participants, an entry probability qe 2 [0; 1] constitutes
an entry equilibrium if (i) D (qe) = 0 and qe 2 (0; 1); or (ii) D (qe)  0 and
qe = 0; or (iii) D (qe)  0 and qe = 1.
The payo¤ function in (4) above is dened in terms of q. An equilibrium
number of participants is attained when either (i), (ii) or (iii) are satised. The
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rst part of (i), (ii) and (iii) states that in an entry equilibrium, participants
should at least break even, otherwise no player is willing to participate. The
second part states that entry stops when further entry leads to payo¤s falling
below break even point (i.e.,  (q) = 0) or when the entire subset of players
who are willing to join after observing the level of entry fee joins (i.e., q =
1). In other words, for q 2 (0; 1) to constitute a mixed-strategy equilibrium,
the payo¤ must be zero. That is, each potential player must be indi¤erent
between participating and not participating. Because of the denition of entry
equilibrium, there is necessarily complete rent dissipation when q 2 (0; 1).
Lemma 2 (Existence of simultaneous entry equilibrium under policy of dis-
closure). For each feasible contest with simultaneous entry where the number
of participants is disclosed, a symmetric entry equilibrium must exist.
Proof. If D(1;K)  0, qe = 1 must be an entry equilibrium. If D(0;K)  0,
qe = 0 must be an entry equilibrium. If D(1;K) > 0 and D(1;K) < 0, there
must exist qe 2 (0; 1) such that D(qe;K) = 0 as D(0;K)  0 and D(q;K)
is continuous in q. Thus a symmetric entry equilibrium must exist.
In an entry equilibrium qe, denote by T ED the total e¤ort under a policy








qNe (1  qe)K N NeD(N). (5)
Lemma 3 (Size of nal prize scheme). For the optimal contest design with
simultaneous entry and policy of disclosure, there is no loss of generality to
adopt the prize scheme VN = B0 +N  F
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which increases with VN . For a given F , each VN is maximised when all the
entry feesN F collected are added to the winner prize. This implies that every
D(N) would also be maximised. If qe = 1 is originally an entry equilibrium,
it would still be an entry equilibrium when all entry fees are added to the
budget B0 as the nal prize. If qe = 0 is originally an entry equilibrium, the
new entry equilibrium must be higher as D(1) = B0 > 0 when entry fees are
added to winner prize. If the original entry equilibrium qe falls within (0; 1),
we must have D(qe;K)  0 when entry fees are added to winner prize. For
the nal prize scheme, note that D(1;K) might be higher or lower than 0: In
either case, there must exist an entry equilibrium probability which is higher
than the original one when the new prize scheme is adopted.
Note that with the new prize scheme, every eD(N) is weakly higher and
eD(N) increases with N . In addition, the new prize scheme admits an entry
equilibrium with weakly higher entry probability. Denote the original entry
equilibrium by qe and the new entry equlibrium by ~qe. We have ~qe  qe. With-
out loss of generality we assume ~qe > qe. We rst study how the probabilities




























< 1, which means that for the event of zero par-
ticipation, the new prize scheme leads to a lower probability. For the event
of K entrants, clearly the new prize scheme leads to a higher probability, i.e.
N > 1. Note that ~qe > qe and 1  qe > 1  ~qe, which leads to that ~qe(1 qe)qe(1 ~qe) > 1.
This means that N increases with N . Based on the above discussion, there
exists a N^  1 and N^  K   1 such that N < 1 when N  N^ and N > 1
when N > N^ . Thus the new prize scheme leads to lower probabilities for
events with lower numbers of entrants, and higher probabilities for events
with high numbers of entrants. Since every eD(N) is weakly higher and e

D(N)
increases with N when the new prize scheme is adopted, we must have that
the new entry equilibrium ~qe leads to higher total expected e¤ort with the
new prize scheme. In summary, there is no loss of generality to adopt prize
scheme VN = B0 + N  F for optimal contest design with simultaneous entry
and disclosure of number of entrants.
We further have the following result.
Lemma 4. With prize scheme VN = B0+N F , entry equilibrium qe is unique
and decreases with the entry fee F .








































qN 1(1 q)K N 1 [D(N + 1)  D(N)] < 0;
which means that entry equilibrium is unique. It is also straightforward that
dD(q;K)
dF
< 0. We thus have qe must decrease with F .
The next question is what is the optimal qe or equivalently the optimal
entry F  that maximizes the total expected surplus given K potential players
are shortlisted? Then one can ask what is the optimal number K that should
be shortlisted. We consider these issues in a later stage.
4.2 Concealing the number of participants
Alternatively, the organizer may choose to conceal the number of participants.
This induces additional uncertainty in the expected revenue of a participant.
Suppose K potential players are shortlisted. When other shortlisted players









qN 1 (1  q)K N| {z }
Binomial density of encountering N 1 rivals






qN 1 (1  q)K N is the probability that N out of K players par-
ticipate (or equivalently, participant i faces N   1 rivals) and the subscript
C denotes a policy of concealment by the organizer. In the extreme event in
which q = 1, every potential player participates conditional of the level of
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entry fees and the contest becomes similar to that under a policy of disclosure.
Thus the e¤ect of whether to disclose or conceal the number of participants
is only relevant when q < 1. For the following analysis, we focus on the cases
where equilibrium entry probability is non-zero as inducing no entry can never
be optimal.
Lemma 5 (Equilibrium e¤ort under policy of concealment). Under A1 and

















Proof. See appendix A.2.
Dene the expected payo¤ of a participant, if the other K   1 shortlisted








qN 1 (1  q)K N  VN
N
  [eC(q)]   F: (8)
Lemma 6. Suppose K potential players are shortlisted. In a contest with
simultaneous entry and concealment of the number of participants, entry prob-
ability qe is an entry equilibrium if (i) C (qe) = 0 and qe 2 (0; 1); or (ii)
C (qe)  0 and qe = 0; or (iii) C (qe)  0 and qe = 1.
Compare the payo¤ of a participant under a policy disclosure and conceal-
ment, we nd from expression (4) and (8) that D(q;K) = C(q;K). Together
with the entry equilibrium existence Lemma 2 when number of participants is
disclosed, we have the following result.
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Lemma 7. The entry equilibrium analysis is identical regardless of the disclo-
sure policy.
Corollary 1 (Existence of simultaneous entry equilibrium under policy of
concealment). For each feasible with simultaneous entry where the number of
participants is concealed, a symmetric entry equilibrium must exist.
Corollary 2. With prize scheme, VN = B0 + N  F , entry equilibrium qe is
unique and decreases with the entry fee F .
In an equilibrium qe, denote by T EC the total e¤ort under a policy of
concealment. That is,
T EC  KqeeC(qe). (9)
Lemma 8 (Maximum total e¤ort under a policy of concealment). Under a
policy of concealment, if K potential players are shortlisted and entry proba-
bility induced is qe = q 2 e[0; 1], total e¤ort in equilibrium is bounded above
by













Proof. At an entry equilibrium, it must be true that C(q;K)  0. This gives









qN (1  q)K N VN  KqF:







qN (1  q)K N VN  KqF .
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Lemma 9. For given entry equilibrium qe 2 (0; 1], there exists entry fees
Fe  0 such that the prize scheme VN = B0 + N  F would induce the upper
bound T EC (qe;K).
Proof. We rst show that for any q 2 (0; 1], there exists an F  0 such that
prize scheme VN = B0 + N  F induces the entry equilibrium q. Note that
when F = 0, qe = 1. When VN = B0 +N  F , a participants expected payo¤
decreases with F for any q. Thus there must exist an F^  0 such that a partic-
ipants expected payo¤ is exactly zero. Any F > F^ would induce equilibrium
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entry qe < 1. According to Corollary 2, as F increases, the equilibrium entry
probability must decrease. To induce any entry equilibrium qe 2 (0; 1), we








qN 1e (1  qe)K N 
B0 +N  Fe
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Clearly, when entry fee is set at Fe as above, equilibrium entry qe is then in-
duced. As the above inequality indicates the participantsexpected payo¤s are







Further restrictions are placed on the entry probability q to ensure that
the contest following entry is optimally designed.12 Similarly a subscript C
has been appended to represent the optimal entry probability under a policy
of concealment.
Lemma 10 (Optimal entry probability under policy of concealment). Suppose
the organizer adopts a policy of concealment. (i) When  < 1, Total e¤ort is
maximized when the participants play mixed entry strategies. That is, 0 < qC <
12Note that the subsequent analysis does not explicitly shows how to induce the optimal
entry probability. As such, an appropriate notion of inducing a particular level of entry
probability may be unclear.
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1. (ii) When  > 1, total e¤ort is maximized when the participants enter with
probability qC = 1.






























Sign depends on value of 
9>>=>>; : (11)
Suppose rst   1. This implies that @T EC
@q
 0, thus q = 1 is optimal.
Now consider  < 1. The rst property is that for q = 1, @T EC
@q
< 0. The
second property is that for q ! 0, T EC ! 0 by LHôpital rule. Since T EC is
continuous in q, this means that there is an optimal qC 2 (0; 1) that maximises
total e¤ort and is the solution to @T EC
@q
= 0. That is, qC solves





The sharpest distinction of this paper from Fu et al. (2011) is the intro-
duction of entry fees and its role on the entry decision of players. Assuming
 > 1, Fu et al. (2011) in their paper noted that the optimal entry probabil-
ity is less than one. In contrast, the results in Lemma 10 above showed that
qC = 1 when  > 1. This is the implication of the introduction of entry fees.
Having qC = 1 alleviates the distortions caused by incomplete information on
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the number of participants and allows participants to internalize the e¤ects
of entry fees more e¢ ciently, which increased the size of the nal prize, by
exerting higher e¤ort. Without entry fees to enhance the attractiveness of
the nal prize, the organizer in Fu et al. (2011) can only increase e¤ort when
participants are uncertain of the number of rivals they are competing against,
that is, when q < 1.
4.2.1 Shortlisting under policy of concealment
With stochastic entry, the organizer is unable to consistently implement the
optimal actual number of participants N. From the denition of simultaneous
entry equilibrium, so long as  (q) > 0, participants must be entering the
contest with pure strategy (q = 1). The transition to mixed entry strategies
occurs at  (q) = 0. When participants enter with mixed strategies, attracting
the optimal N may be infeasible in practice as participants enter the contest
stochastically and many realizations of N are not optimal. In this case, the
organizer may alternatively choose to nd out whether total e¤ort conditional
on the expected number of participants varies systematically with the number
of potential players K, given the optimal qC in Lemma 10.
Proposition 1 (Entry fees under policy of concealment). Suppose the orga-
nizer adopts a policy of concealment. (i) When  < 1, the organizer induces

























 1 1  (1  qC)2	 1 .
(ii) When  > 1, the organizer induces the maximum total e¤ort by at-








M   1   1

: (13)





Proof. Now show the optimal number of potential players the organiser would
like to shortlist (i.e. K that maximises total e¤ort) conditional on . Consider
two cases:
Case 1,  < 1: Recall from Lemma 9 that













After taking an increasing transformation by raising it to the power of 
and taking a log transformation, R.H.S. becomes




+ logB0 + (  1) log q:
Applying the Envolope Theorem (optimal q depends on K), F.O.C. with







K log (1  q)
1  (1  q)K :
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Making use of the inequality log (1  q) >  q
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Hence the rst-order condition of the transformed problem is less than
zero. Therefore @T EC
@K
< 0. Total e¤ort is decreasing in the number of potential
players and the organiser would like to attract two potential players. It cannot
be that the organiser attracts one potential player otherwise the player can
exert zero e¤ort and win the prize with certainty.
Using the fact that C(qC;K) = 0, the optimal entry fees can be derived as





























Substituting K = 2 into the expression (14),




























thus the organiser would like to attract the maximum M number of potential
players. Substituting q = 1 and K =M into expression (14) above,







M   1   1

 0:
The proposition identies the optimal number of participants conditional
on the cost parameter . Entry fees are higher in (12) than in (13). Intu-
itively, increasing e¤ort is relatively less expensive with concave costs. As a
result, players favor participation in the contest. The number of participants
increases, expected payo¤ decreases hence eroding the incentive to exert ef-
fort. This explains why the organizer should set higher entry fees to limit
entry when costs are concave.
Similarly, when players have convex costs, the organizer should lower entry
fees to encourage a desirable level of competition. With convex costs, exerting
e¤ort becomes relatively more expensive. In order to attain a desired level of
total e¤ort, the organizer has to attract more participants. The increased num-
ber of participants reduces payo¤s, but the organizer o¤sets this by lowering
the entry fees.
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4.3 Policy of disclosure vs. concealment
A primary aim for the introduction of entry fees is to present the organizer
with an instrument to inuence the entry decisions of players in a contest with
simultaneous entry. It does not follow most of the literature on simultane-
ous entry which assumed that entry decisions are based on exogenous factors.
Such reformulation of the simultaneous entry setting a¤ects the equilibrium
behavior of participants and therefore requires a reexamination of the orga-
nizers optimal disclosure policy by comparing the results from the previous
two subsections. Although the optimal design under a policy of disclosure has
not been explicitly derived, it is seldom required for the analysis.
Lemma 11. With simultaneous entry, both policies of disclosure and conceal-
ment induce the same entry probabilities in equilibrium for any given prize
scheme. However, a policy of disclosure dominates concealment if  < 1;and
concealment dominates disclosure if  > 1.
The rst part of this Lemma is implied by Lemma 7. The second part
about the comparison of disclosure policy is shown by Fu et al. (2011).
Consider the rst possibility that players have concave costs. In this case,
from Proposition 1 the optimal design under a policy of concealment simply
requires that the non-degenerate entry probability to be qC 2 (0; 1) and MC =
2. However, Fu et al. (2010) Theorem 1 guarantees that all things being equal,
when costs are concave, a policy of disclosure must dominate concealment. In
other words, a contest under a policy of disclosure with qC and M

C = 2 will




C = 2 (the latter of which is already the optimal design under a
policy of concealment). Thus the best design under a policy of disclosure
must necessarily induce higher total e¤ort than a policy of concealment. This
result is put into the follow proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose simultaneous entry and  < 1, the optimal design
under a policy of disclosure must necessarily induce higher total e¤ort than a
policy of concealment.
In fact with a policy of disclosure, the optimal entry probability qD must
also be non-degenerate for any K  2 shortlisted. Suppose in contradiction
qD = 1, both disclosure and concealment policy must induce the same e¤ort.
Yet from Lemma 10, under a concealment policy, total e¤ort when entry equi-
librium q < 1 is greater than total e¤ort at q = 1. Therefore if qD = 1, total
e¤ort under a policy of disclosure would have been dominated by total e¤ort
under a policy of concealment, which is a contradiction. Since the optimal de-
sign under a policy of disclosure should induce higher total e¤ort than policy
of concealment at q, qD is less than one.
Corollary 3. Suppose simultaneous entry and  < 1. For any K  2 short-
listed, the optimal equilibrium entry qD is less than one when the number of
participants is disclosed.
However, to pin down the optimal shortlisted K under a policy of disclo-
sure is not an easy task.
The irrelevance of an explicit derivation of the optimal design under policy
of disclosure can be extended to the second possibility where players have
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convex costs. All things being equal, convex costs mean that total e¤ort
under a policy of concealment dominates disclosure except when q = 1, where
both policies induce the same e¤ort. When  > 1, qC = 1 and K

C = M
induces the maximum total e¤ort under a policy of concealment hence in a
sense the organizer is indi¤erent between either policy. We thus have the
following result.
Proposition 3. Suppose simultaneous entry and  > 1. The disclosure policy
is not relevant.
The subsequent analysis is meant to justify the di¤erence in ndings be-
tween Proposition 1 above and Fu et al. (2011). Besides the di¤erence in
optimal entry probability between the two papers, it has been argued in Fu
et al. (2011) that even with convex costs the organizer avoids inviting the full
set of potential players because this increases the competitiveness of the con-
test. As a result, players enter less often and exert lesser e¤ort. By proposing
an alternative setting whereby the organizer is able to collect entry fees and
to add the sum collected to the nal prize, the enhanced nal prize o¤sets the
e¤ect of increased competitiveness and having more participants may increase
e¤ort instead.
Based on similar arguments for the case of  < 1, we have the following
results for the case of  > 1.
Corollary 4. Suppose simultaneous entry and  > 1. For any K  2 short-
listed players, the optimal equilibrium entry qD exactly equals to 1 when the
number of participants is disclosed.
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Corollary 5. Suppose simultaneous entry and  > 1, when the number of
participants is disclosed, at the optimum the organizer includes all potential
players and everyone enters.
5 Sequential entry
Consider now the relatively simple case of sequential entry to analyze the
optimal design. Note that with sequential entry, the number of entrants is
always observed by all potential contestants. Thus there is no role here for
disclosure policy on the number of participants. The only possible equilibrium
entries are discrete. In addition, for sequential entry, there is no role for
shortlisting of potential players. If not, it must be true that at the optimum
all the shortlisted (K < M) enter but each of them enjoy a positive surplus.
In this case, the organizer can further increase the entry fee without changing
the winner prize to make their payo¤ to be zero, which means K of them
entering the contest would be an entry equilibrium without shortlisting. The
total e¤ort remains the same.
We can extend the analysis of Fu and Lu (2010a) to cases with nonlinear
costs. Similar to the case of  > 1 in Proposition 1, we have the following
result.
Proposition 4. Given an entry equilibrium of N participants is induced, the



















Proposition 5 (Entry fees under sequential entry). (i) Suppose  < 1. The
organizer induces the highest possible e¤ort of the contest with an entry equi-











V N = B0 +NF . (16)





(ii) Suppose  > 1. The organizer induces the highest possible e¤ort of












V N = B0 +NF : (18)




Again such behavior can be justied by the same logic underlying short-
listing in the case of simultaneous entry. Concave e¤ort costs mean that the
organizer should set an entry fee that attracts only two participants. In con-
trast, convex e¤ort costs mean that the organizer should set an entry fee
that attracts all potential players. A further insight obtained from the above
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proposition is that when  < 1, entry fees under simultaneous entry with con-
cealment are higher than under sequential entry. Expression (12) makes clear
the source of distortion and shows that the higher entry fees are a consequence
of participants entering the contest with probability less than one. The higher
the probability of entry qC, the closer are the two levels of entry fees.
Entry fees do not directly a¤ect participantse¤ort level in equilibrium,
yet they are used by the organizer to control the number of participants and
also to capture any of their remaining surpluses.
6 Simultaneous vs. sequential entry
In this section, I compare the total e¤ort elicited under each entry pattern and
thereby state the main results of the paper.
If  < 1, simultaneous entry with a policy of concealment also dominates














 1 1  (1  qC)2	 1 , which is equal to 2  B02  1 if and only if
qC = 1: However, the argument in Lemma 10 proves that a non-dengenerate
qC induces a higher level of e¤ort than when qe = 1.
Theorem 1 (Optimal entry sequence with concave costs). Suppose  < 1 and
contest is optimally designed for each case in terms of shortlisting and entry
fees. Their performance in terms of total e¤ort can be ranked in the following
descending order: simultaneous entry with disclosure (highest), simultaneous
entry with concealment, sequential (lowest).
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From an applied perspective, the results provides a rationale why govern-
ments tend to announce a shortlist of rms in numerous contest where rms
costs can be formulated as being concave.13
Theorem 2 (Optimal entry sequence with convex costs). Suppose  > 1 and
contest is optimally designed for each case in terms of shortlisting and entry
fees. All entry sequences and disclosure policy induce the same e¤ort at the
optimum.
These results are summarized in Table 1 below.
7 Concluding remarks
By capturing features of contests in a simple manner, this paper hopes to
improve our understanding of contest design with nonlinear e¤ort costs. The
contrived theory provides a basis for the logic underlying policy designs in
many competitive settings and a clear sense of the interaction between the four
instruments available to the contest organizer: shortlisting of potential players,
entry sequence of participants (either simultaneous or sequential), entry fees
paid by participants, and disclosure policy of the number of participants. We
found that the nonlinearity of the e¤ort cost function plays a critical role for
13In Singapore, competitions to design and build the integrated resorts and sports hub, to
name a few, all exhibit the above characteristics. Another prominent example in Singapore is
the competition among transport operators for the license to operate a package of bus routes
for a xed period of time. Operators compete based on their e¢ ciency and service quality.
It is reasonable to take the view that operators costs are concave (e.g., higher marginal
costs of e¤ort which decreases with learning-by-doing). Together the above results predict
that the government should shortlist a subset of operators for consideration (prominent

















Optimal K M M M
Table 1: Summary of results
the optimal design of the contest. If cost functions are concave, simultaneous
entry with a policy of disclosure would induce the highest e¤ort when the
right number of contestants are shortlisted. If cost functions are convex, all
combinations of entry pattern and disclosure policy induce the same optimal
entry and the same amount of total e¤ort when the contests are optimally
designed in each scenario.
The discussion is still imperfect in certain ways. For example, we could
not explicitly pinned down the optimal number of contestants being shortlisted
under simultaneous entry with a policy of disclosure. This step can be avoided,
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Appendix
A Simultaneous entry
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1









 VN   ei   F:
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Let e^i = ei and R =
r

be a monotonic transformation of the problem.





































2  VN   1 = 0: (19)
At the symmetric equilibrium (8i 2 N ; e^i = e^), equation (19) becomes
Re^2R 1 (N   1)
N2e^2R
 VN   1 = 0;













By an increasing transformation, existence and uniqueness of the equilib-
rium is guaranteed by Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (2008).
Q.E.D.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 5















r  VN   (eCi)   F:
Let ~eCi = (eCi)
 and R = r







































i2  VN   1 = 0: (21)











 VN   1 = 0;





























Existence and uniqueness has been proven in Fu et al. (2011).
Q.E.D.
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